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BSTRT½CT
The taxation of corporate assets is well understood to influence invest-
ment and firm valuation. This paper explores theconsequences of postwar U.S.
tax changes in a dynamic model which incorporates costs of adjustment and
investor expectations of future tax reforms and macroeconomicvariability.
When viewed in a dynamic context, the tax code can havevery different incen-
tives than those implied by the usual static analysis. Simulationresults
suggest that investment is sensitive to future tax changes and business—cycle
movements. The paper also illustrates the implications of this analysis for













Since the work of Hall and Jorgenson (1967), there has been
considerable empirical analysis of the effects of taxation on investment
behavior. The literature concentrates on several issues.Initially, it
emphasized the pattern and strength of the investment response to changes in
the "user cost of capital" induced by changes in taxation (Hall and Jorgenson
1971, Eisner and Nadiri 1968, Bischoff 1971, Clark 1979). In this work,
investment was typically divided into two classes, structures and equipment.
More recently, several studies have emphasized the effects of
particular tax provisions on the incentives to invest -in different types of
assets, calculating "effective tax rates" based on the user cost of capital
for several classes of assets at a more disaggregated level (Auerbach and
Jorgenson 1980, Jorgenson and Sullivan 1981, Hulten and Robertson 1982,
Gravelle 1981, Auerbach 1983, King and Fullerton 1984).These studies
focused on the "long run" effects of different tax systems. They did not
explore how short-run investment behavior might be influenced by anticipted
changes in the tax code or costs of adjusting capital stocks to the higher or
lower levels optimal under new tax policy regimes.
Though such analysis is extremely helpful in understanding the
overall incentive effects of very complicated tax systems, the emphasis on
steady state behavior may be misleading in a world where the tax law changes
as frequently as it does. A review of recent U.S. legislative history
illustrates this point.
The year 1981 saw the "tax cut to end all tax cuts," the Economic—2—
Recovery Tax Act, which substantially reduced both corporate and individual
income tax collections and contained provisions scheduled for introduction as
late as 1986. One year later, Congress raised taxes, undoing some of the
provisions already in operation and cancelling others yet to become effective.
This happened again in 1984. Now, in 1985, there is serious discussion of a
number of a number of tax proposals that again would markedly change the
environment faced by taxpayers. A bet against change would appear to face
long odds.1
In attempting to understand the likely effects of policy changes,
there is little justification for ignoring this record, or for assuming that
investors will. Indeed, the problem of "dynamic inconsistency", in which
government will have the incentive in the future to adopt different tax
policies than those promised today, was first discussed using the investment
tax credit as an example (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Unanticipated changes
in the investment tax credit provide an efficient "bang for the buck" in terms
of increased investment per dollar of lost tax revenue, because old capital is
excluded from benefitting from the tax reduction. This may also be viewed as
a capital levy on existing assets, since their quasirents will be driven down
by increases in new investment (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1983). Yet anticipated
changes in the investment tax credit would obviously have very different
effects.
The purpose of this paper is to bring to the literature on the
effects of tax policies on investment incentives an explicit treatment of
short run transition behavior, taking full account of the provisions of the—3-
tax law and allowing for varying degrees of foresight on the part of investors
and costs of adjustment to increasing the capital stock. Though these
questions have been studied using the q model of investment (beginning with
Summers 1981), the emphasis in such work has been on estimation of adjustment
costs and the prediction of the behavior of investment to one-time shocks to
investment incentives. Closest in spirit to the our analysis is the work of
Abel (1982), who showed how temporary and anticpated changes in tax provisions
would affect current investment and the value of "marginal q" (the net cost of
new capital goods) in the q model. One may view the present paper as an
empirical application of his analysis to the postwar U.S. experience and the
current tax reform debate.
Among the questions we seek to answer below are:
• What effects, taken together, have all the postwar
changes in investment incentives had on investment?
• What effects should different historical policy
changes have had on the market value of corporations?
• Because of the structure of adjustment costs and
differences in the durability of different types of
capital, how does the pattern of investment
incentives across asset types differ between the long
and short runs?
• What would be the impact of tax reform proposals of
the kind currently being discussed on investment and-4-
securities values? How would various phase-in plans
for these proposals alter their impacts?
How important are expectations about future tax
changes when there are substantial costs to adjusting
the capital stock?
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
model. Following this is a discussion of how the model's parametersare
chosen, and the simulation technique used to solve for the paths of investment
and market values over time. We then proceed to analyze the questionsjust
raised, looking first at historical investment behavior and then at the
current situation.
Modelling Investment Behavior
The model of investment used in this paper assumes that thereare
two types of fixed investment (structures and equipment) and costs to
adjusting the capital stock that may be separate or mutual and may differ
between structures and equipment. It is, in other words, aq investment model
with two types of capital. We choose this level of aggregation to allow
comparability with previous work, and because the greatest variation in tax
treatment has historically been between these two broad classes of assets.
Consistent with the data, ours is a discrete time model with one
year intervals. Each capital good is assumed to decay exponentially, and the
representative, competitive firm produces its output using labor and the two-5—
types of capital subject to a constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas
production function, with a1 and a2 representing the gross shares (including
depreciation) of the equipment and structures, respectively, in production.




where'it and K,t are net investment and capital of type I in year t, and
are sums over both types of investment and capital, and , and 2 are
adjustment cost terms reflecting joint costs and costs specific to the two
types of capital, respectively.
Given the homogeneity of the production function and adjustment cost
function with respect to the scale of the firm, the value of the firm will be
proportional to the size of its capital stock and the behavior of all firms
can be represented by a single, aggregate representative firm.
The quadratic adjustment cost function in (1) is a two-capital-good
version of the one used by Summers (1981) in his empirical analysis. It also
differs in two other respects. First, it is based on net, rather than gross
investment. Second, there is no constant subtracted from the ratio I/K in
each quadratic term. However, one may equivalently view the current model as
being based on gross investment, with a constant equal to the rate, 6, of
economic depreciation being subtracted. Either way, the notion is that
minimum average adjustment costs (in this case, zero) occur when net
investment is zero. This makes sense if one views the costs as general ones
involving changing the scale of operations rather than bolting down—6—
the new machines. Summers's preferred estimate of the constant term (.088) is
quite consistent with this interpretation.
We ignore changes in relative prices between capital goods and
output and between different types of capital, and assume that all new
investment goods have a real price of unity in every year. The adjustment
costs are assumed to be "internalt1, in that they relate not to an upward
sloping supply schedule for capital goods but the costs of absorption at the
firm level. This is consistent with the observation that historical
fluctuations in capital goods prices are relatively minor compared to
estimated costs of adjustment.
The firm's optimization problem consists of choosing equipment,
structures and labor at each time t, taking account of current and (to the
extent of the assumed planning horizon) future economic conditions. There is
no risk from the firm's point of view; whatever it expects about the future
(right or wrong) is expected with certainty.If we let the production
function in the three factor inputs be F(.), then the firm seeks to maximize
its value at time t, equal to the discounted value of its real, after-tax cash
flows:






where N5 is the labor input in period s, r is the real, after-tax required
return, w is the real wage rate paid at the end of year s, D.(s,x) isthe
depreciation allowance at the beginning of year s for assets of type i
purchased at the beginning of year x, k,t is the investment tax credit
received on investment of type I at the beginning of year t, c is the rate of
inflation, ó is the rate at which capital of type I depreciates, G1t is gross
investment of type I at the beginning of year t, andTt is the tax rate at the
beginning of year t Depreciation allowances decay at the inflation rate
because they are not indexed.
We use the convention that year t investment occurs at the beginning
of the period, while quasirents occur at the end, with period t investment
yielding its first return at the end of the same period. We also assume that
adjustment costs are immediately expensed, as would be the case for internal
adjustment costs that require extra factors or reduce productivity. Gross and
net investment of type i are related by the identity:
(3) G1t ='it
+
For labor, the optimal condition derived by differentiating (2) with
respect to N calls for the firm to set the marginal product of labor equal to
the real wage. As usual in models of this sort with constant returns to
scale, the labor demand equation is omitted from explicit analysis. For each
type of capital good I, it is most convenient to derive the first order
condition with respect to gross investment at each date t, Gft. Assuming, for











is the "total" marginal product of capital at the end of period t, taking
account of reduced concurrent costs of adjustment, and q is the marginal




Equation(5) reminds the reader that there are two components to the
firm's marginal value of an additional piece of capital this year: the
marginal product of capital (dFt+i/dKt) and the reduction in next year's
adjustment costs (dAti/dKt). Expression (4) says that firms should invest in
capital of type i at date t until its marginal product, after tax, equals its
after tax cost (multiplied by (1+r) because costs are borne at the beginning
of the period) less the present value of investment credits, depreciation
allowances and future quasirents. Thus, the expression is the result of the
optimal backward solution for firm behavior. When expectations are static, as
is commonly assumed, (4) reduces to the standard user cost of capital formula:-9--
(7) =
wherez1, equals the present value of depreciation allowances 01(s,t) and
(8) =
is a tax-adjusted price of new capital goods that we will interpret below.
Because of the assumption that production is governed by a
Cobb-Douglas production function, the direct marginal product of óapital of
type i in period t is:
(1—a1—a2) —(i—a.) a.
(9) F.t =aN a.K. K.3
where a is the production function constant. Thus, given the optimal choice
of labor input, expressions (4) and (5) for i and j give us two equations in
the capital stocks Kit and K2t. Without adjustment costs, this would permit a
closed form, backward solution for these capital stocks in each period.4
However, since depends on lagged capital stocks, this solution method is no
longer possible, and we must resort to simulation analysis.
Parameterization
Three types of parameters appear in the model just described,
relating to production (a, a1, a2, 11 ö, and taxation (T, k1,
k2, D1(') and D2(•)) and financial markets (r and it).For it, we use the
realized values of the GNP deflator (year on year), while T is set equal to
the statutory corporate tax rate that prevailed for the majority of the-10-
year.5 In order to calculate the production paramaters a and 6 and the tax
terms k and D(.), it is necessary to aggregate data on thirty-four classes of
assets for which we have data (twenty equipment and fourteen structures) into
corresponding values for aggregate equipment and structures. This turns out
to be a very complex problem.
What we seek are parameters for aggregate capital goods that, by
some measure, accurately reflect those of their components. One criterion
that seems reasonable is to require that, for a particular tax system, both
net and gross rates of return to capital before tax be the same for the
aggregate assets as for the sums of their components. A particular motivation
for using this approach is that it results 'in the effective tax rate, as
usually measured, being invariant to the aggregation procedure.
To see what weights this criterion dictates, consider first the
special case in which adjustment costs are zero and expectations are myopic.
Let be the fraction of capital stock j of the total in its class I
(equipment or structures) at a particular date. (We suppress the time
subscript but emphasize that these capital stock weights are not time
invariant.) The gross before tax return to capital of type I is then:
(10) p1 = = Q..(r+ö.) (1—k.—Tz.)/(1-T)
J 3
whereo, k and z3 correspond to asset j. The net return is:
(11) r = —
Thus,the criterion would be satisfied by weighting the indvidual values of 6
by capital stock weights ci and the tax parameters k and z by ci(r+ô); the tax—11—
parameters of short-lived assets should be more heavily weighted. This is an
important choice, since the values of k+Tz generally increase monotonically
with
Since capital stock weights change over time, this formula would
require recomputation every year. However, this presents an index number
problem, and it is unclear that we should prefer a measure with varying
weights. Even after this issue is resolved, one must deal with the problem of
adjustment costs and varying values of asset-specific q's, about which there
is little information. Finally, there is the problem of expectations. When
the marginal product of capital is dictated by expression (4), there are no
simple weights (that we can think of!) that satisfy the criterion. One would
generally have to determine the weights simultaneously with the solution for
the marginal product itself, which would make the problem intractible.
In light of the situation, we choose to weight 5 by j and tax
parameters by &2(r+S), using fixed values for r and the capital stock weights cz
overtime. The capital stock weights used are for the year 1977, as described
in Auerbach (1983). The rates of economic depreciation come from calculations
by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). The fixed value used for r is .04.
Once values of 8] and 2 are known, it is possible to estimate the
capital share parameters a1 and a2 from production and capital stock data. We
begin by calculating the net-of-depreciation, before-tax return to capital in
the corporate sector in 1977 by dividing the difference between value added
and labor compensation in the corporate sector, taken from the 1977 Census of
Manufactures, by the total corporate capital stock, equal to equipment and—12-
structures plus inventories and land. We then assume that all forms of
capital earned this before-tax rate of return, Rg•7 Next, we assume that the
Cobb-Douglas production function specified above refers to gross output net of






where V is value added and K3 and K4 are stocks of inventories and land.
Once we have obtained this value of G, we note that, since output is
observed net of adjustment costs, the production function F(.) must satisfy:
(13) F(K1,K2,N) =6+A(I)
Finally, we define the net return to capital of type i (i=1,2) in the current
period as being the derivative of 0 with respect to K, holding constant the
capital stock growth rates (11/K1), (12/K2) and (I/K), less depreciation a1.9






which can immediately be solved for a1.'°





with the estimated value of Rg equal to 1O.4. This estimate of the marginal
product of capital (which is used in the current version of the paper only in
the calculation of a1 and a2)11 is consistent with previous findings. In
interpreting the sizes of the two share coefficients, it should be remembered
that these are shares in gross output, less estimated returns to land and
inventories. Relative to usual calculations of the capital share of net
output, the first of these factors (the use of gross output) would lead to a
larger total share (since depreciation is included in both numerator and
denominator) while the second (excluding part of the capital stock) would lead
to a smaller total share (since returns to excluded capital are subtracted
from both numerator and denominator.)
Finally, the production function constant a is obtained by dividing
F(.) by the product of its component factors raised to the power of their
respective factor shares. We then assume that the labor input, in efficiency
units, grows at a constant rate of 3 over the entire sample period.12 This
imparts a trend rate of growth to the steady state of the model, and is set
slightly below the historical capital stock growth rate of about 4 because
part of that growth may be attributable to the historical decline in effective
tax rates on investment.
The only parameters that remain to be chosen are the adjustment
costs terms ,1and 2' which are quite crucial to our analysis. Previous
studies have inferred these parameters from regressions of investment on
"tax—adjusted q". The authors of these studies have derived "tax-adjusted q"
by correcting the ratio of the market value of the firm to its capital stock—14—
(presumed to be average q) for tax factors such as the investment tax credit,
accelerated depreciation and the deductibility of adjustment costs that would
cause marginal and average q to differ. In one case (Abel and Blanchard
1984), average q is explicity estimated from projected future profits and
interest rates. A regression of I on adjusted q can then be interpreted as
estimating the inverted marginal cost function.
In a model with one capital stock, the coefficient on adjusted q
would be an estimate of 1/a, the inverted marginal adjustment cost. Although
such regressions cannot be done if there is more than one capital stock, one
can still interpret the coefficient as the inverse of the sum of marginal
adjustment costs associated with investment of type i, or in the
current model.
Empirical investigations have found this coefficient to be quite
small. Using annual data, Summers (1981) chose a "preferred" value of .031
from his many regressions, implying a value of the marginal adjustment cost
of 32.2, while Poterba and Summers (1983) found slightly lower values of 1/
using British data. Using quarterly U.S. data, Abel and Blanchard (1984)
found values of 1/ of between 0 and .015.
However, for many reasons usually pointed out by authors of the
previous studies themselves, these coefficients (which are not always even
statistically significant) may be prone to serious downward bias because of an
inexact measure of q being used.13
Estimated speeds of adjustment based on such high adjustment costs
appear to be unreasonably slow, given previous work on investment behavior.—15--
For example, Summers (1981) finds that half of the long run increase in
investment that occurs in response to an unanticipated increase in the
investment tax credit is achieved after approximately eight years. The same
pattern of adjustment occurs in response to an immediate cut in the corporate
tax rate. Previous studies based on the neoclassical model (modified to allow
slower responses to changes in the cost of capital than to changes in output)
found the same percentage of the long run adjustment to be reached in about
eight quarters or less (Bischoff 1971, Clark 1979). Similar response patterns
have been obtained from a comparison of different full model simulations
(Chirinko and Eisner 1983).
While we are quite uncertain what the "true" value ofis, it seems
appropriate to use one that provides more reasonable speeds of adjustment.
Some experimentation suggests an overall value of=12,which we arbitrarily
divide equally between own and common adjustment costs. That is, we assume
that == 2=6.In future work, we hope to obtain our own empirical
estimates of these parameters.
Solution of the Model
In the presence of adjustment costs, the model as specified can only
be solved numerically. There exist different techniques to obtain such
solutions. The one used here is based on the approach first taken in a q
model by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). The actual algorithm used depends on
the policy experiment considered.
All simulations begin with the assumption that, prior to 1954, the-16-
economy was in a steady state: that economic conditions had been stable for
sufficiently long that the stocks of both kinds of capital had completely
adjusted, and no change in these conditions was anticipated. Though this is
undoubtedly inaccurate, some such assumption is required to fix the inital
values of capital stocks in a way that is consistent with the assumed
production technology.
This solution for the steady state in 1953 does not depend onany
future variables. Indeed, when expectations are assumed to becompletely
myopic throughout, the model can then be solved forward without iteration,
with each year's solution beginning withKt_i and solving for Kt. At the
other extreme is the assumption of perfect foresight. By this,we mean that
all tax and inflation rates are correctly anticipated until the present.14 It
is hard to implement this assumption for future dates, so we makeassumptions
about the values of these variables and suppose that firms' expectations match
them. We then solve the model into the 21st century toguarantee convergence
to a new steady state.
Our method begins with a path of initial guesses for the capital
stocks of each type in each year. Then, a version of expression (4), with the
guess of Kt_i held constant at time t, is solved backward for a new vector of
capital stocks. These are used to update the previous guesses, and the
procedure is repeated until convergence is reached.
In cases in which we wish to assume that expectations are forward
looking until some particular date of a change in regime, we solve the model
in the manner just described but stipulate that people assume that thetax—17—
parameters prevailing in the year before the regime shift will remain
unchanged forever. This simulation generates capital stocks for theyear
before the regime shift. Next, we take these capital stocks and use themas
the initial ones for a second simulation that begins in thatyear and
continues into the future. For example, if one wished to assume that from
1954 through 1961 no investment tax credit was anticipated, but that after its
introduction in 1962 no further mistakes were made, one would follow the
procedure just described using 1962 as the year of the regime shift. This
approach is very useful in analyzing current policy alternatives since,
whatever is anticipated, the current capital stocks are certainly fixed and
cannot change if a policy shift is announced.
Measuring the Effects of Policies
Once the solution paths are obtained for the two capital stocks, we
calculate three variables of interest. One is the averageq of the
representative firm, its value relative to the replacement cost of its capital
stock. This starts with the marginal q obtained directly from the adjustment
cost function, and then takes account of the variety of tax provisions that
make old and new capital differ in value. The second is the effective tax
rate, which summarizes the incentive to invest in a particular asset in a
given year. The third is the net investment flows of equipment and structures
which the simulation generates.
Estimatin9 Average q-18-
It is this variable that tells us what the overall impact of a tax
change will be on market value. Generally, there will be two effects. To the
extent that the incentive to invest -increases, marginal q, defined to be the
basic price of a unit of capital capital plus the derivative of the adjustment
cost function with respect to investment, will rise. In the absence of
taxes, the homogeneity of production and adjustment cost functions would imply
that this would also be the firm's value per unit of capital.
But to the extent that the new incentive magnifies the distinction
between new and old capital, the difference between marginal q and average q
will also rise. The net effect on average q can be either positive or
negative for expansionary or contract-ionary policies. Holding marginal q
constant, an increase in average q may be viewed as a lump sum transfer to the
owners of corporate capital.
The formula for average q is based on an arbitrage condition between
old and new capital. Since new capital goods must generate after-tax cash
flows equal to marginal q, it follows that:
(15) =Tt[o(It/Kt_i)+ (It1Kt_1)I + PV + k.t + Ts0i (5,t)
where is marginal q and PV is the present value of the after-tax
quasirents accruing to an new asset purchased for one dollar at date t. Since
capital purchased at t'<t has a present value of quasirents of (l_oi)ttPVit,
it follows that its value at date t, per efficiency unit of capital, is:
(16) = Pvit+T5D(S,t')]/(l-â)tt-19—
Solution of (15) for and substitution of this expression into (16) gives
a solution for the value of capital of type i and cohort t' at time t, in
terms of From (1) and the definition of marginal q, we also have:
(17) =1+ot'Kt)
+jtK1t)
Combining (16) and (17) to get each cohort's value, we then aggregate these
values of average q over all vintages and both types of capital to obtainan
overall value for the firm at date t.
Note that this expression for average q is consistent with the
assumption of perfect foresight. When myopic expectations are assumed, we
change (15) and (16) correspondingly.
Calculating Effective Tax Rates
In models based on myopic expectations, it is common to define the
effective tax rate to be the percentage difference between the net (of
depreciation) marginal products of capital before and after taxes. Given a
fixed after-tax return, this calculation also tells us what the beforetax, or
social return to capital must be for the firm to earn zero profits. Unless
the economy actually is in a steady state, however, this will be correctonly
in the year the calculation is made. Hence, the effective tax rateas
commonly used measures the required before-tax return to capital in the same
year, assuming myopia.
When firms are not myopic, the formula for the user cost of capital
is different, but we can still answer the same question, viz., what rate of-20-
return on capital must the firm earn in the current year, taking account of
future changes in taxes, inflation and the firm's marginal product of capital?
As before, this will tell us what the firm's rate of return on investment must
be, before taxes, in the current year. Dropping subsrcripts, the effective
tax rate is defined to be:
(18) 0 =((p/q-- r]/(p/q-6)
where p is the marginal product of capital defined in (5).
It is not clear which value of q should be used in (18). The most
obvious candidate is marginal q, as defined in expression (17). However, use
of this value has the effect of incorporating the tax deduction for adjustment
costs in the effective tax rate. This is perfectly acceptable; it reflects
the fact that part of the cost of investment is expensed. However, it makes
more difficult a comparison with previous results, since even when there is
economic depreciation of direct capital costs, the effective tax rate will be
less than T. By using the tax adjusted value, q', defined in (8),15 one
"undoestt the differential tax treatment of adjustment costs, and obtains the
usual results for expensing, economic depreciation, and other special cases.
Hence, for the sake of comparability with other studies in which adjustment
costs were ignored, we take this latter approach.
Simulation Results
This section presents the results of simulations, chosen to provide
answers to some of the questions raised in the introduction.We begin by—21—
comparing the historical measures of average q and investment that would have
prevailed with and without adjustment costs. Because of the erratic behavior
that would occur under perfect foresight in the absence of adjustment costs,
we perform this comparison under the assumption of myopic expectations. By
construction, effective tax rates for the two simulations will be identical,
since all differences will be absorbed in q', the tax-adjusted cost of capital
goods that is used in expression (18).16 The main point is to illustrate the
smoothing of investment and the impact that movements in marginal q have on
average q when adjustment costs are present. Both simulations are performed
for the period 1953-1990, with the assumption made that the Bradley-Gephardt
"Fair Tax" plan -is implemented in 1985. This plan would lower the corporate
tax rate to 3O, repeal the investment tax credit and provide declining
balance depreciation allowances designed to have a present value of near that
of economic depreciation at rates of inflation like those recently experienced
in the U.S.17
Table la presents effective tax rates for these two simulations.
For each year, there are two numbers: the effective tax rates for equipment
and structures, respectively. These results are quite consistent with those
of the previous literature.17
Beginning from effective tax rates in 1953 well above the statutory
rate of 52 for equipment, and somewhat lower for structures, rates move lower
with the tax changes introduced in 1954, and again in 1962 with the
introduction of the investment tax credit. Tax rates on equipment go down
again in 1972 with the reintroduction of the investment tax credit and the—22-
introduction of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System. By 1980, higher
rates of inflation have pushed effective tax rates back up again, particularly
on equipment. The introduction of ACRS in 1981 brought effective tax rates on
equipment essentially to zero, also lowering tax rates on structures to an
postwar low. Reduced inflation in 1982 brought tax rates down still
further.19 Rates went up in 1983 on equipment and 1984 on structures because
of the 1982 and 1984 tax acts, which introduced a fifty percent basis
adjustment for the investment tax credit and an eighteen year (instead of
fifteen year) tax life for structures, respectively.
A switch to Bradley-Gephardt in 1985 would substantially increase
the effective tax rate on equipment, leaving both effective tax rates near the
statutory rate of .30. The constancy of effective tax rates reflects the
assumption of constant future real interest rates and inflation.
Table lb displays values for average q, or g, for the simulation
without adjustment costs, for structures, equipment, and in the aggregate,
based on estimated capital stock composition and tax treatment in each year.
Since there are no adjustment costs in this case, marginal q is identically
equal to one, so movements in average q are entirely due to changes in the
relative tax treatment of new and old capital.
These values of average q have also declined over the years as the
distinction made by the tax system between old and new capital has widened.
Under a system of economic depreciation, average q would equal marginal q net
of the tax deduction of adjustment costs, as defined in (6) (averaged over the
two types of capital). With no adjustment costs this value is, of course,-23-
one. The estimated time series given in Table lb suggest that average q was
actually above one in 1953. After the acceleration of depreciation allowances
in 1954, and throughout the 1950s and until 1962, average q wasapproximately
equal to one. However, since then g has been lower, reaching a low of .80 in
1981 and staying near this value since.20 A switch to Bradley-Gephardt in
1985 would return average q back to a value of approximately one, as
depreciation allowances are decelerated and the investment tax credit removed,
thereby removing the tax distinction between old and new capital.
The net investment rates for equipment, structures and in the
aggregate under the no-adjustment-cost simulation are displayed in Table ic,
expressed as a percentage of the respective capital stocks. These numbers are
quite unrealistic, as one would expect them to be. But if one wants to allow
for a sluggish adjustment of investment, this must be carried through
consistenly to other calculations, such as for average q.
With adjustment costs present, the nature of the results for
investment and average q change quite dramatically. Because marginal
adjustment costs are high when investment demand is strong, firms seek to
smooth their investment. At the same time, the value of average q diverges
from one not only because of the distinction between new and old capital but
also because of the presence of marginal adjustment costs. Given the value of
the sum of and I3 for i=1,2 and the statutory tax rate of about .5, this
increases the value of average q by about 6 times the growth rate of capital,
or .18 in the long run. In the short run, average q is determined both by the
distinction between new and old capital (the difference between average q and-24-
marginal q) and the value of marginal q itself. A change in the incentive to
invest will typically affect both of these terms, sometimes in different
directions.
These results can be seen immediately from the time series displayed
in Table 2b. The aggregate value of average q starts out at 1.23, indicating
a very small aggregate difference in the tax treatment of new and old capital.
For equipment, depreciation slower than economic depreciation leads to a
premium in the value of old capital goods. The value of average q falls very
little in 1981, from 1.09 to 1.08, as the increase in marginal q associated
with more investment nearly outweighs the effect of the levy on old capital.
A similar effect is present for the period 1971-72, when the reinstitution of
the investment tax credit and the introduction of the Asset Depreciation Range
for equipment incresed the incentive to invest. Without costs of adjustment,
aggregate average q drops from .94 to .88. With costs of adjustment, it does
not drop at all.
The sharp increase in average q that occurs in 1985 is due to the
decreases distinction between old and new capital introduced by
Bradley-Gephardt. In the short run, this effect dominates the decline in
marginal q associated with a reduced incentive to invest in equipment.
Table 2c presents the net investment figures produced by the
simulations. The impact of adjustment costs is clear. Though investment
still increases in years of increased investment incentives, such as 1962,
1972 and 1981, these increases are of the order of magnitude of 0.5 percent to
1.1 percent of the aggregate capital stock. Such changes are well within the—25—
range of historical fluctuations in investment, representing a swing of
perhaps 2 percent of output. The proposed switch to Bradley-Gephardt in 1985
would reduce investment by about .4 percent of the capital stock, although a
decline of about .1 percent would occur even without any such change, as net
investment slowly approaches its assumed steady state value of 3.0 percent of
the capital stock.
Tables 3a, b and c present the results of a simulation of behavior
over the same period under the assumption that there is perfect foresight as
well as adjustment costs to investment. We assume that, prior to 1984,
expectations about what would happen in years 1954-1984 were correct. It is
obviously impossible to simulate perfect foresight about the years 1985 and
beyond, so we assume that firms expected 1984 to be characteristic of all
subsequent years.We also provide information in the table for the years
1985-1990 under the assumption that the Bradley-Gephardt plan is introduced
unexpectedly in 1985 and that there is perfect foresight about the future
impact of this policy, once introduced.
A major effect, seen in Table 3a, is the increase in effective tax
rates that occurs in years before increases in investment incentives that do
not benefit old capital but reduce its marginal product. This is evident in
1961, 1971 and 1980, when the effective tax rates on both structures and
equipment rise from the previous year's values, in contrast to declines for
each year that were seen for the myopic case.
One can also see differences in the pattern of investment over time,
compared to the case of myopia (with adjustment costs), although there does-26-
not appear to be any noticeable increase in the volatility of the series, as
one might have expected. Under perfect foresight, aggregate net investment
varies between 3.1 percent of the capital stock in 1971 and 4.8 percent in
1962, 1981 and 1982. Under myopic expectations, the range is from 2.8 percent
in 1970 to 4.6 percent in 1982 and 1983.
In general, it is difficult to compare the investment series in
Tables 2c and 3c for any particular year, since the entire time path of
investment and expectations is different under the two assumptions. For
example, investment in equipment increases from 3.5 percent to 3.9 percent
during 1980-81 under myopic expectations and from 4.1 percent to 4.4 percent
under perfect foresight. One cannot say that the effect of expectations is to
reduce the effect of the 1981 incentives, however, since there is a natural
tendancy for investment to decline over time toward the steady state value of
3.0 percent, at a faster rate for higher levels of investment.
The different assumption about expectations has a relatively
insignificant impact on average q. This is because, with statutory tax rates
changing little over time, the only real differences in the formula come from
the use of different nominal interest rates to discount depreciation
allowances and the use of different future marginal products of capital to
calculate the present value of after-tax quasirents, PV.
One of the criticisms of schemes like the Bradley-Gephardt plan and
other proposals to lower statutory tax rates is that they provide transfers to
old capital and reduce the incentive to invest. This outcome is evident in
Table 3, as well as in the earlier tables. But supporters argue that such-27-
plans encompassing low statutory rates and economic depreciation allowances
are desirable for other reasons.21 Hence, it would be useful to know whether
this characteristic of reducing average tax rates whileincreasing marginal
ones can be influenced by a phasing in of one of the new plans.
This possibility is examined in our simulation presented inTable 4.
We assume the same path for the years 1953-84 as is presented in Table3, and
that in 1985 a phase-in plan for Bradley-Gephardt is announced andimplemented
with perfect foresight beginning in 1985. The phase-in calls for the
immediate removal of the investment tax credit and ACRS depreciation,but only
a gradual reduction in corporate tax rates, to 42% in 1986, 38% in 1987,34%
in 1988 and 30% in 1989.This policy would, obviously, involve a smaller
revenue loss than one with an immediate reduction in the corporate tax rateto
30%, as was simulated in Table 3.
The results in Table 4 show that the increase inaverage q is about
the same as without the phase-in. This masks two offsettingeffects, however.
First, the incentive to invest is increased by the phase-in. Second, the
windfalls received by owners of existing assets are reduced. Ascan be seen
from a comparison of the investment figures in Tables 3c and4, the gradual
reduction in the corporate tax rate leads to an acceleration ofinvestment,
with more investment in both structures and equipment in each of theyears
between 1985 and 1988, and less thereafter.
These higher rates of investment are associated with the desireby
firms to invest while their depreciation allowances (which still havean
accelerated pattern relative to economic depreciation) have greater value in-28-
generating tax deductions, as discussed by Abel (1982). Thus, this phase-in
leads to a situation where investment actually rises in the aggregate in 1985
with the enactment of Bradley-Gephardt, while at the same time reducing the
extent of its windfall to old capital.
To compare the effects of these different tax plans, net investment
figures are much more helpful than effective tax rates, as measured for the
perfect foresight case. With the phase-in, effective tax rates are actually
higher in 1985 (compare Tables 3a and 4), but this simply reflects the fact
that investment is higher in 1985 and expected to decline faster under the
phase-in. This means larger anticipated capital losses as marginal q
declines, necessitating a somewhat higher current marginal product to
compensate investors.
Naturally, this beneficial effect depends on the tax change being
unanticipated. To the extent that firms in earlier years might have expected
such discriminatory treatment of their assets, their investment levels would
have been lower than indicated by the simulations.
The simulation results presented so far are based, of course, on highly
stylized assumptions about the production technology, the pattern of true eco-
nomic deprectiation, aggregation over firms and assets, methods of financing
marginal investments, and other variables. Since this model was designed to
capture the effects of historical tax changes on firm valuation and investment
incentives, we examined the sensitivity of our results to different specifica-
tions of the historical pattern of required returns and marginal products of
capital.-29-
Tables 5 and 6a present simulation results for a perfect foresight
scenario (with adjustment costs) in which firms' required rate of return
corresponds to the risk-adjusted after-tax real rate on 4- to 6-month
commercial paper which prevailed in the year of investment. This series on
adjusted interest rates was calculated by (19):
(19) ra =0.06+(1—T)PR—INFL
where ra is the adjusted rate, PR is the nominal (annualized) return on 4— to
6-month paper, and INFL is the contemporaneous inflation rate (which firms
know exactly since the simulations assume perfect foresight). The after-tax
risk premium in (19) is 6, which roughly corresponds to the historical dif-
ference between after-tax risk-free interest rates and after-tax profit rates.
While for reasons mentioned earlier it can be misleading to compare two
investment series year-for-year, a comparison of Tables 3 and 6a reveals some
important trends. The simulation which uses adjusted commercial paper rates
shows investment through 1975 which has a similar pattern but is generally
higher than investment in the constant interest rate simulation. As interest
rates rise in the mid—1970's the capital stock adjusts and investment rates
are lower than in the constant-rate simulation. One example of this adjust-
ment is the slackening of investment in structures in 1976, which contrasts
with the acceleration of structures investment for that year in the constant-
rate simulation.
A more striking difference comes in the switch-over to Bradley-Gephardt
in 1985. Table 6a reveals equipment investment to fall dramatically in-30--
response to the removal of some of its tax preferences in 1985, a result which
is more pronounced than the investment drop in the constant-rate simulation.
The difference reflects the post-1970's long-term adjustment of the capital
stock to lower levels and the consequences of unfavorable tax changes on top
of this adjustment. For structures, investment recovers slightly in 1985,
while still reflecting that the stock of structures is too high for a
sustained 3 growth rate. This contrasts with the seemingly small effect of
Bradley-Gephardt on structures investment in the constant-rate case.
Average q in the first column of Table 5 moves in a fashion similar to
average q in Table 3, with the exception that higher investment keeps average
q above the constant-rate average q through 1975 by its effect on marginal q.
In general, interest rate changes will have three effects on average q
(relative to constant—rate calculations): one, through changes in
contemporaneous investment and marginal q, another through changes in the
nominal discount rate if old capital is locked into depreciation patterns
which are accelerated to a different degree (for the remaining basis) than
that currently in use, and a third through changes in investment patterns
which affect the depreciation pattern composition of old capital.
Since postwar tax reforms have generally increased the acceleration of
depreciation allowances each time, one expects that higher interest rates will
usually produce lower values of average q through all of these effects. Table
5 reflects the consequences of rising interest rates in the late 1970's and
1980's, as average q falls below one in 1980 and continues to fall steadily
until the introduction of Bradley—Gephardt in 1985. The 1985 tax reform has—31-
similar effects on the value of old capital in the variable-interest rate case
and in the constant-rate case. For equipment, this result is the product of
the sharp deceleration of depreciation deductions which just balances the
effect of investment disincentives on marginal q. For structures, the 1985
investment incentives raise marginal q slightly, while the depressing effects
of higher interest rates on average q are less important than for equipment
since a smaller fraction of the structures capital stock was put in place with
the accelerated post-1981 depreciation schedules.
Tables 5 and 6b report the results of simulations in which the required
rate of return was held constant (at 0.04) but the marginal product of capital
varied cyclically around its long—run growth path. These simulations assume
that firms have perfect foresight and that adjustment costs are present.
In order to obtain a historical series of marginal products consistent
with the production function technology specified earlier, we used data on
after-tax corporate rates of return from Feldstein, et. al. (1983). Assuming
capital market equilibrium and constant returns technology, this rate of
return will be equal to the marginal gross return to capital,Rg in (14).
Note that this methodology implicitly assumes that yearly variation in the
return to capital is attributable to shocks to the production function and not
to changes in the capital/labor ratio. As before, we assume for the purpose
of calculating production function coefficients that net investment is 3 each
year. Then, using (9) and (14), the technical and labor-related component of
the production function can be computed:












where s is the share of capital of type i in the capital stock (s1 +s21).
Since (20) is a relationship which holds for all years, it must hold for
1977, the year from which values are calibrated. Marginal products of capital
for all other years were calculated using a1 anda2 to solve for atNta12)
relative to its value in 1977:21
(1—a —a2) —
aN





The investment pattern shown in Table 6b is slightly lower but closely
resembles that of Table 3 until the late 1960's. Starting then, investment
falls from its levels in the benchmark run, while maintaining analogous
year-to-year movements. No doubt these results in Table 6b reflect the
declining rate of return to capital, the economic malaise captured here as
marginal products which fall from trend values. Equipment investment declines
sharply -in response to the unexpected tax regime change in 1985, while
investment in structures rises slightly. Both of these results are quite
similar to those found in Table 3.
Average q in the second column of Table 5 tracks the values of average q
in Table 3, with the exception that it falls more quickly starting in the late—33—
1960's. Average q makes a recovery in 1985, though not to ashigh a level as
in the runs reported in Table 3. Naturally, these resultsare the products of
the investment decline brought about by lower marginal products.Lower
marginal q's generate lower average q's during the period 1967-1984, and the
lower average q's in 1985 (especially for structures) reflect thata smaller
fraction of the capital stock -in place in thatyear was depreciated using the
most accelerated methods.
Tables 5 and 6c presents results for the simulations in which both
interest rates and marginal products were permitted tovary in the manner
described above. Not surprisingly, these results resemble a combination of
those in Tables 6a, 6b, and the first two columns of Table 5.Investment in
both equipment and structures declines starting in the late 1960's, and is
somewhat more volatile throughout the period than was the case in earlier
runs. High interest rates and declining marginal products deliver a combined
hammer blow to investment (especially in structures) at the end of the1970's,
an effect much stronger than in any of the other runs. When Bradley—Gephardt
is introduced in 1985, equipment investment again declinesdramatically and
structures investment stays quite low while recovering somewhat.
Average q's in the third column of Table 6 follow patterns similar to
those of the first two columns, with declining q's in the late 1960's
following those of column two and leading those of column one by a fewyears.
By the mid-1970's, however, the investment disaster produces low marginal q's
which drive average q below the values in other columns and below one in 1977.
Average q continues to fall until 1985, when its recovery is on the same order—34—
of magnitude as recoveries in other runs.
In comparing results from different foresight and business cycle specifi—
cations, it is reasonable to contrast simulated investment and average q to
values which prevailed over this period. Table 7 presents net corporate
investment, expressed as a fraction of the capital stock, in equipment and
structures for the period 1953-1984. These investment rates are not derived
from the published BEA net investment series; they are calculated by applying
the BEA gross investment data and Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates to form a
perpetual inventory of corporate capital assuming the published 1925 net capi-
tal stock to be accurate. The investment series produced by this method are
then measured consistently with net investment calculations from the simula-
tion runs.
Table 7 illustrates several sharp features of the postwar investment
experience. Equipment investment strongly accelerates in the mid-1960's, pre-
sumably in response to the introduction of the investment tax credit and
repeal of the Long amendment. Both equipment and structures appear to be
affected by business cycle downturns in 1970—1971 and 1975—1976. Structures
never recover from the latter shock, with the tax code and high interest rates
combining to prevent net investment in every year of the post-1975 period from
equalling any of its previous values.
These features of the historical investment pattern seem to be best cap-
tured by the perfect foresight simulations with varying interest rates.
Investment in the simulation with myopic expectations and no adjustment costs
(Table ic) responds too quickly to tax changes, producing anomalous results—35—
such as negative equipment investment in 1966, the historical peak. Even when
adjustment costs are added to the myopic run (Table 2c), the model fails to
replicate the equipment investment boom in the 1960's and the decline of
structures investment in the 1970's. The perfect foresight simulation which
ignores business-cycle effects (Table 3c) also fails to capture the magnitude
of these swings; in fact, this run shows structures investment to accelerate
in 1981. The perfect foresight simulation with variable marginal products but
a constant interest rate (Table 6b) produces results similarly at odds with
investment data.
Tables 6a and 6c, which report simulations in which firms have perfect
foresight and interest rates vary, contain investment series which appear to
track actual investment most closely. Equipment investment rises strongly in
the mid-1960's, though not as much as in the historical data. In both simula-
tions the late 1970's are very hard on structures investment. The results in
Table 6c, which come from a simulation in which both interest rates and margi-
nal products vary, show a very deep drop in structures investment at the end
of the 1970's. The magnitude of investment swings in Table 6c makes Table 6a
(perfect foresight and variable interest rates only) appear to mirror histori-
cal investment most closely. While these comparisons do not constitute a sta-
tistical test, they suggest the importance of interest rate movements to any
tax—based explanation of investment behavior. It is possible that with a dif-
ferent specification of adjustment costs business-cycle influences on marginal
products could provide useful realism as well.—36—
Conclusions
This paper represents a first attempt to characterize investment
behavior in a manner that allows one to consider the effects of different tax
policy changes on the investment behavior of firms and the value of their
shares. Our simulated results indicate how important the presence of
adjustment costs are when one wishes to consider how an abrupt change in the
economic environment will affect the firm. This is particularly true if tax
changes are either announced or anticipated.
There are a number of extensions one would wish to consider before
using simulations such as these for more than illustrative purposes. We hope
to include in the simulations the effects of changes in personal taxes, given
some assumptions about the determination of the firm's financial policy.
Perhaps most important and yet most difficult is the task of obtaining better
estimates of the production parameters. The adjustment cost terms, about
which we have the least empirical evidence, are, unfortunately, possibly the
most crucial to our results. We hope to remedy this situation. At the same
time, sensitivity analysis of the simulation results would be desirable.Notes
1. Nor is the frequency of policy changes unique to the U.S. Britain
has shown an equal variability of tax provisions (as described in Poterba and
Summers 1983 and King and Fullerton 1984), most recently (in 1984) scaling
back provisions for the expensing of investment and lowering the corporate tax
rate, as most reform proposals being discussed currently in the U.S. would.
2. For ease of notation, we write A(.) as a function of alone rather
than all its arguments.
3. The constancy of itisnot assumed in our analysis, and is used here
only for the sake of simplicity. Some of the later simulations examine the
effect of allowing r to vary.
4. Note that net investment is simply the first difference of the capi-
tal stock.
5. This and other tax data used is described in Appendix A of Auerbach
(1983).
6. We note in passing that if the rate of growth of the capital stock,
say g, equals the interest rate, then this latter set of weights corresponds
to using investment flow weights rather than capital stock weights.
7. This would be true only if, among other things, the effective tax
rates on all forms of capital were equal, which they were not.
8. This assumption is required if we are to consider the investment
decisions separately for structures and equipment.
9. This marginal product definition is required for G to be homogeneous
of degree one with respect to its inputs.
10. The internal consistency of this procedure can be verified by noting





62K2]which, by (12) and (13), equals
[v- Rg(K3+K4)
-
(1-a1-a2)F].Thus, the net returns to capital equal value
added less the competitive return to labor.
11. In future work, we intend to examine how well simulations with time—
varying parameters do in predicting observed movements in the marginal product
of capital rg.
12. Denison (1979, p. 92) finds all factors and productivity changes
other than capital growth to contribute exactly 3.OO annually to the growth
of U.S. nonresidential business output over the period 1948-1973. While this
figure includes noncorporate businesses and would presumably be lower over theperiod of the 1970ts, it suggests that 3 isthe most reasonable choice for
the exogenous growth rate of noncapital inputs.
13. These include the presence of returns toother factors in the firm's
market value, heterogeneity of the capital stock andthe standard use of a tax
adjustment based on myopia of expectations aboutfuture changes in the tax
law. Some evidence in support of this comes from the finding byAbel and
Blanchard that the coefficient of investment on adjusted qrises substantially
(to between .084 and .121 for quarterly data)when the variable is purged of
that part of its variation estimated to have come fromfluctuations in the
cost of capital (as opposed to profitability).
14. This is also trivially true of the real, requiredafter-tax return,
which in the first four simulations is set equal to a constantrate of 4.
This simplification is relaxed in the later simulations.
15. When expectations are nonmyopic, q' is defined consistently,with
future changes in T taken into account.
16. To see this, note that, except for q', the costof capital in (7)
depends on parameters exogenous to the firm.
17. See Auerbach (1984) for a further discussionof the plan. It is
quite similar in character to the one introduced bythe U.S. Treasury in
November, 1984.
18. The main differences with calculations reportedin Auerbach (1983)
are the alternative method of aggregationand the use of the current value,
rather than an ARIMA forecast, of the inflation rate.These variations do not
have an important impact on the results.
19. The much stronger effect of changes in theinflation rate on the tax
rate for equipment is due to its having a shorterlifetime than structures.
See Auerbach (1979) for further discussion.
20. These results are quite similar to those presentedin Auerbach
(1983).
21. For example, the reduced problem of tax lossesthat would result
from the removal of front-loading of depreciation allowancesthat causes a
temporal mismatch between taxable cash flowsand tax deductions.References
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Investment: Myopic (No Adjustment Costs)Table 2b
































































































































































































































































































































































1990 0.25 0.33Table 3b






























































































































































Year Equipment Structures Total
1953 0.030 0.030 0.030
1954 0.039 0.042 0.041
1955 0.038 0.041 0.040
1956 0.039 0.041 0.040
1957 0.039 0.041 0.040
1958 0.039 0.040 0.040
1959 0.039 0.040 0.039
1960 0.039 0.039 0.039
1961 0.038 0.038 0.038
1962 0.055 0.043 0.047
1963 0.051 0.042 0.045
1964 0.050 0.039 0.043
1QRS fl rr.7 n na
1966 0.042 0.036 0.038
1967 0.028 0.035 0.033
1968 0.046 0.039 0.041
1969 0.045 0.039 0.041
1970 0.029 0.033 0.032
1971 0.030 0.031 0.031
1972 0.052 0.032 0.039
1973 0.049 0.032 0.038
1974 0.048 0.032 0.038
1975 0.048 0.033 0.038
1976 0.043 0.038 0.040
1977 0.043 0.038 0.040
1978 0.042 0.038 0.039
1979 0.040 0.036 0.038
1980 0.041 0.037 0.038
1981 0.044 0.049 0.047
1982 0.043 0.049 0.047
1983 0.038 0.047 0.044
1984 0.039 0.043 0.041
1985 0.022 0.043 0.036
1986 0.023 0.042 0.035
1987 0.024 0.041 0.035
1988 0.025 0.040 0.035
1989 0.026 0.039 0.035
1990 0.027 0.038 0.034Table 4
Gradual Tax Reform: 1985
(Perfect Foresight)

















































































Total Average q: Interest Rate and Marginal Product Variants
(Perfect Foresight)
Interest Rate Marginal ProductInterest rate and Marg.
Year Varies Varies Product Vary
1953
1954 1.29 1.24 1.28
1955 1.29 1.24 1.28
1956 1.28 1.23 1.26
1957 1.27 1.23 1.25
1958 1.25 1.23 1.24
1959 1.25 1.23 1.25
1960 1.25 1.23 1.25
1961 1.25 1.23 1.25 1Q I 1 1 2 a.——
1963 1.25 1.21 1.25
1964 1.24 1.19 1.24
1965 1.24 1.16 1.23
1966 1.24 1.14 1.21
1967 1.24 1.12 1.19
1958 1.24 1.11 1.18
1969 1.23 1.09 1.16
1970 1.23 1.08 1.15
1971 1.22 1.08 1.14
1972 1.19 1.07 1.12
1973 1.18 1.06 1.10
1974 1.17 1.06 1.09
1975 1.14 1.06 1.07
1976 1.09 1.06 1.02
1977 1.06 1.05 1.00
1978 1.04 1.05 0.97
1979 1.01 1.04 0.94
1980 0.99 1.04 0.92
1981 0.96 1.04 0.90
1982 0.94 1.05 0.89
1983 0.94 1.05 0.90
1984 0.94 1.05 0.90
1985 1.10 1.21 1.05
1986 1.10 1.20 1.06
1987 1.10 1.20 1.06
1988 1.11 1.19 1.07
1989 1.11 1.19 1.07
1990 1.12 1.19 1.08Table 6a
Investment: Variable Interest Rates
(Perfect foresight)
Year Equipment Structures Total
1953 0.030 0.030 0.030
1954 0.044 0.048 0.047
1955 0.043 0.048 0.046
1956 0.042 0.046 0.045
1957 0.041 0.043 0.042
1958 0.039 0.041 0.040
1959 0.039 0.040 0.040
1960 0.040 0.040 0.040
1961 0.041 0.041 0.041
1962 0.059 0.048 0.052 lr u.u 0.048 0.051
1964 0.057 0.047 0.050
1965 0.052 0.046 0.048
1966 0.051 0.047 0.049
1967 0.038 0.048 0.044
1968 0.058 0.053 0.055
1969 0.055 0.052 0.053
1970 0.039 0.044 0.042
1971 0.038 0.042 0.040
1972 0.058 0.040 0.047
1973 0.055 0.039 0.045
1974 0.052 0.039 0.044
1975 0.047 0.035 0.039
1976 0.038 0.030 0.033
1977 0.034 0.027 0.030
1978 0.031 0.023 0.026
1979 0.026 0.018 0.021
1980 0.024 0.014 0.018
1981 0.025 0.023 0.024
1982 0.023 0.020 0.021
1983 0.019 0.019 0.019
1984 0.020 0.015 0.017
1985 0.008 0.022 0.016
1986 0.010 0.022 0.017
1987 0.013 0.022 0.018
1988 0.014 0.022 0.019
1989 0.016 0.022 0.020
1990 0.018 0.023 0.021Table 6b




























































































































































































































































































































U.S. Corporate Investment, 1953-1984
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Equipment
0.051
0.036
0.047
0.050
0.049
0.005
0.023
0.030
0.020
0.035
0.041
0.060
0.081
0.096
0.070
0.070
0.073
0.052
0.036
0.053
0.076
0.066
0.028
0.034
0.054
0.062
0.062
0.054
0.052
0.029
0.036
0.067
Structures
0.037
0.035
0.041
0.043
0.039
0.031
0.028
0.032
0.032
0.033
0.031
0.034
0.044
0.045
0.041
0.041
0.041
0.036
0.030
0.031
0.034
0.030
0.021
0.020
0.018
0.022
0.027
0.024
0.023
0.021
0.014
0.027
Total
0.042
0.035
0.043
0.045
0.043
0.021
0.026
0.031
0.028
0.034
0.034
0.043
0.057
0.064
0.052
0.052
0.054
0.042
0.032
0.040
0.051
0.045
0.024
0.026
0.034
0.040
0.043
0.038
0.036
0.024
0.024
0.046